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Can economic growth be sustained?  Is technical change the engine of economic growth?  
These issues have generated intense controversy since at least the early years of the industrial 
revolution.  They emerged with even greater intensity during the last half of the 20
th century. 
During the late 1990's, a spurt of growth in output and productivity led the business press, and 
some economists, to proclaim that the economy had entered a new era in which the old rules that 
had governed cyclical and secular growth in the past no longer obtained (Stiroh, 1999).  During 
this next century the U.S. and the other advanced industrial countries will be confronted by a 
new challenge - to make the service sector the driver of economic growth.  
  In the Malthus-Ricardo classical model growth is constrained by an inelastic supply of 
natural resources.
1  In the neoclassical model, economic growth is constrained by the rate of 
growth of the labor force (Solow, 1956; Prescott, 1988).  In both the classical and neoclassical  
models the constraints on growth were released by exogenous technical change.  In the new 
growth economics the constraints are released by endogenous technical change driven by the 
                                                 
** This paper draws on material from Vernon W. Ruttan, Technology, Growth and Development: An Induced 
Innovation Perspective.  New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001.  I am indebted to Hamid Mohtadi and 
Steven Polasky for comments on earlier drafts. 
* Vernon W. Ruttan is Regents Professor Emeritus in the Department of Applied Economics and in the Department 
of Economics and Adjunct Professor in the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of 
Minnesota. 
1 The classical model, termed by Schumpeter “the magnificent dynamics, emerged between the publication in 1776 
of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1937) and the publication in 1817 of David Ricardo's, The Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation (1991).  Malthus is best known for his 1798, An Essay on the Principle of Taxation 
(1970).  For an intellectual history of the development of the classical model see Tribe (1978: 110-46). accumulation of knowledge and human capital (Romer, 1986, 1996; Lucas, 1988, 1993).
2  In this 
note I argue that in the future economic growth in the United States will be constrained by 
service sector productivity. 
 
LIMITS TO GROWTH 
Economists and technologists have typically taken an optimistic view toward the 
possibilities of sustainable growth.  Ecologists and many natural scientists have often taken a 
more pessimistic view.
3  Environmentalists have replaced economists as the dismal scientists!  
The trauma of the Great Depression and the fear of post World War II economic instability 
directed economists' attention to explore the conditions, and the economic policies that could 
lead to “steady state” sustainable economic growth (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946, Solow, 1956).  
Productivity growth, resulting from technical change, was identified as a fundamental source of 
economic growth.  Concerns about the constraints imposed by natural resource scarcity receded.  
Beginning in the 1970s, economists' optimism about economic growth was challenged by 
the coincidence of a global energy crisis and the slowing of economic growth in the developed 
industrial economies.  The Ricardo-Malthus concern with the adequacy of the natural resource 
base to sustain economic growth was supplemented by an intense concern about environmental 
degradation.  These were highlighted for the general public by the press coverage given to the 
book Limits to Growth sponsored by the Club of Rome.
4 
                                                 
2 For a review of both the neoclassical and the new growth economics literature from a development economics 
perspective see Ruttan (1998). 
3 This disagreement is illustrated by the running debate between ecologist Paul Ehrlich and economist Julian Simon.  
For the Ehrlich and Simon arguments see: P. R. Ehrlich (1986); P. R. Ehrlich and A. H. Ehrlich (1970); Simon 
(1980, 1981).  For comment in the popular press on the debate see J. Tierney (1990) and C. McCoy (1995); P. R. 
Ehrlich and S. H. Schneider (1995).  See also Myers and J. Simon (1994). 
4See Meadows, Meadows and Randers (1972).  For a critical review see Nordhaus (1973).  For an update see 
Meadows, Meadows and Randers (1992). The three main elements in these new concerns were:   
•  Continued concern about scarcity of food, raw materials and energy under conditions of 
burgeoning population growth. 
•  Rising demand for environmental assimilation of residuals--the spillovers into the 
environment of pollutants arising as by-products from commodity production, energy 
production and transportation. 
•  Growth in consumer demand for environmental amenities--for the direct consumption of 
environmental services associated with rapid growth in per capita income and high 
income elasticity of demand for environmental services such as freedom from pollution 
and congestion. 
During the 1980s fears about the adequacy of material and energy resources abated.  But 
concern about the implications of a series of environmental changes that were occurring at the 
global level intensified.  These included the possibility that increases in the concentration of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and other “greenhouse” gasses in the atmosphere were leading to massive 
climate change and that human encroachment on the environment was leading to irreparable loss 
of biodiversity (Turner et al., 1990; Stern et al., 1992). 
There has also emerged since the 1970s a renewed concern about the “social limits to 
growth.”  In the 1920s the German historian Oswald Spengler (1926, 1928) argued that Western 
“culture” had lost its dynamism and was heading toward becoming a static “civilization.”  In the 
mid-1980s Yale historian Paul Kennedy (1986) put forth the theses that strategic “overreach”--an 
imbalance between strategic commitment and economic capacity--had been the major source of 
decline in major empires in the past and had become a source of excessive burden on economic 
growth in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. since the middle of the 20
th century.  It would have been considered excessively audacious however, even in 1986, to predict the imminent collapse of 
Soviet Empire.   
Among its critics technical change came to be regarded as part of the problem 
confronting both the modern world and the poor countries that had been left behind.  The view 
became pervasive in both popular and elite culture that modern technology--reflected in the 
cataclysm of war, the degradation of the environment, and the psychological cost of rapid social 
change--was dangerous to the modern world and the future of humankind (Lawless, 1977; 
Wager, 1982).  In a much more sophisticated exploration of the social limits to growth Fred 
Hirsch (1976) has argued that the good things of life are restricted not only by the physical limits 




In this section I present the results of a two sector economic growth simulation 
constructed in the spirit of the Ricardo-Malthus classical model.  Natural resources, however, 
play no role in the model.  The model is excessively simple when compared to the complexity of 
the world that we live in.  Yet even in its simplicity it has features that most of us will recognize 
as similar to our world. The lesson of the simulation is that continued slow growth in 
productivity in the service sector of the U.S. economy will result in a dampening of economic 
growth for the entire economy.  An implication of the model is in that slow growth in labor  
 productivity and in per capita income may be unavoidable even in the absence of resource 
constraints!
5 
The model economy is composed of two sectors--the automobile sector and the education 
sector (Table 1).  In the automobile sector technical change generates a rate of growth in labor 
productivity (output per worker) of 3.0 percent per year.  In the education sector there is no 
technical change.  Labor productivity, the student-teacher ratio, remains unchanged.  The name 
that I have given the two sectors is not important.  I could have labeled one sector “professional 
sports”--the number of players on baseball and football teams have not changed in my memory.  
I could have labeled the other sector “everything else”--all those progressive goods and service 
production activities that have experienced technical change and productivity growth.  I could 
have labeled one section the service sector and the other the material goods producing sector. 
In Table 1 I present two sub models.  In Model I all of the gains in productivity are 
realized in the form of an increase in automobile (or material) consumption.  None of the labor  
released by gains in labor productivity in the automobile sector is transferred to the education (or 
service) sector.  It is used to produce more automobiles (or material goods).  In Model II, I 
assume that all of the labor released by productivity in the automobile sector is transferred to the 
education (or service) sector.  The two models can be viewed as extreme limiting cases of the 
same underlying model.
6 
**(Table 1 about here)** 
                                                 
5 The standard neoclassical model avoids the Ricardian constraints by including only labor and capital in its 
aggregate production function.  But, as Solow has noted, if land and other resource constraints were included the 
neoclassical model "would become more classical" (Solow, 1956:66). 
6The inspiration for the two models in Table 1 is the Baumol service sector “cost-disease” model (1967); Baumol, 
Batey-Blackman and Wolff (1989): 124-126.   In Model I population and labor force remains unchanged--the economy has already 
achieved zero population growth.  Note that the number of workers in each sector remains 100 
(or an index of 100) over the entire 30 years in which I let the simulation run.  With labor 
productivity rising at 3 percent per year and the number of workers unchanged labor productivity 
and automobile production both rise from an index of 100 to 243.  I also assume that workers 
have a contract with the automobile industry that specifies that wages will increase at the same 
rate as labor productivity.  This assumption is consistent with the overall experience in the U.S. 
economy for most of the post World War II period (Figure 1).  Thus wage rates rise to $2.43 per 
hour.  If we had started with wages at $10.00 per hour they would have risen to $24.30 per hour.  
Note also that the price of automobiles remains unchanged.  Because of the rise in labor 
productivity it was possible to hold automobile prices unchanged while increasing workers' wage 
rates because of productivity growth. 
**(Figure 1 about here)** 
Now let us examine what happens in the education sector.  Labor productivity does not 
rise at all but teachers' wages rise at the same rate as in the automobile sector.  If teachers’ wages 
do not rise they will walk across the street and take jobs in the automobile sector.  But if 
productivity doesn't rise and wages do rise, the cost of schooling (or tuition) must also rise.  In 
the economy of Model I students (or taxpayers) are paying a lot more for education but are not 
consuming more education.  This tendency for wages to rise in labor intensive sectors that are 
not able to achieve productivity growth has been termed by Baumol “the service sector cost-
disease” (Baumol, 1967). 
The world of Model I may not look exactly like the world we live in. But most of us 
would agree that it has been easier to get productivity growth in the automobile sector than in the education sector.  And most would also agree, even without looking at the numbers, that the cost 
of education has risen several times as fast as the cost of automobiles. 
In Model II we take a modest step toward making that simulation more realistic.  It is 
quite possible, even before we have two cars in every garage, the demand for automobiles--or the 
material components of consumption--might begin to fall off.  People begin to resist what 
Easterlin has termed “the triumph of material wants over humanity” (1996: 154) In more 
technical language, the income elasticity of demand for automobiles (or material consumption) 
declines as incomes rise.  People prefer to consume more education or other forms of “cultural 
consumption” (such as baseball games or symphony concerts). 
It may be a bit extreme but in Model II we are going to hold automobile consumption 
unchanged.  As productivity growth releases workers from automobile production they will be 
transferred to the education sector.  This resembles the structural transformation that has 
occurred in the American economy over the last half century (Figures 2 and 3; Table 2).  
Consumption of agricultural commodities in the U.S. no longer rises as income rises.  
Employment in agriculture has declined from almost 50 percent of total employment in 1870 to 
less than 2 percent in the late 1990s.  Employment in manufacturing, mining and construction 
has declined from over 30 percent of total employment in 1950 to less than 20 percent. 
Employment in the service sector (including government) accounted for over 75 percent of the 
labor force in the late 1990s. Even before the burst of the “new economy” growth bubble it was 
already clear that employment in the sectors producing material goods, agriculture and 
manufacturing, would fall to below 10 percent of the labor force in the U.S. within the next 
several decades. The recent declaration of a global “war on terrorism” will accelerate the transfer of labor from the goods producing to the service sector in the form of domestic and international 
security services. The effect will be a further dampening of service sector productivity growth. 
**(Figures 2 and 3; Table 2 about here)** 
 Note that in the model economy, employment in the automobile sector has declined from 
100 workers to 41 (or from 100,000 to 41,000) over the 30-year period.  If the productivity 
growth process that has been set in motion continues to run the time will come, in the not too 
distant future, when there will be only one worker left in the automobile sector.  Note also that in 
each decade the three percent annual decline in the labor force releases fewer workers to be 
transferred to the education sector (3 percent of 100 workers is 3 workers, 3 percent of 67 
workers is only 2 workers and 3 percent of 33 workers is only 1 worker). 
As the number of workers released by productivity growth in the automobile sector 
declines the rate of growth of output in the education sector slows down.  But the cost per unit of 
output in the education sector continues to rise as before.  As the number of workers that can be 
transferred from the automobile sector declines, and the share of employment in the total 
economy employed in the education sector rises, the growth of the total economy grinds to a halt.  
Workers and consumers have higher levels of consumption than at the beginning--either in the 
form of more automobiles (as in Model I) or in the form of more education (as in Model II) or, 
under some cases intermediate to I and II, more of both.  But eventually growth stops!  We have 
backed into a no growth economy—not because of the 19
th century Malthus-Ricardo resource 
constraints or the late 20
th century environmental constraints—but because of failure to achieve 
productivity growth in at least some service sector industries. 
 PERSPECTIVE 
It appears from the simulation that if there is even one important sector which does not 
achieve productivity growth, it will eventually cause the entire economy to grind to a halt--and 
the larger the share of the economy that does not achieve productivity growth the more rapidly 
the economy will approach a zero growth “steady state”!  This will be substantially lower than 
the common high per capita income-low steady state growth that Lucas (2000) recently 
suggested the world would adhere to by the closing decades of the 21
st century (Lucas, 2000).   
The “New Economy” growth acceleration that began in the mid-1990’s was due to a 
dramatic rise in the rate of growth of investment and in technical change in the information 
technology (IT) industries. The IT industries accounted for less than 5 percent of Gross National 
Product (GNP). But they accounted for almost half of productivity growth in the U.S. economy 
during 1995-1999. A rate of growth in labor productivity in the 4.0 percent per year range is 
unlikely to survive an anticipated slowdown in the maturing IT industries (Jorgenson 2001). The 
more serious constraint on growth in labor productivity will, however, occur as a result of the 
continuing decline in the share of output accounted for by the goods producing sectors and the 
difficulty of enhancing the rate of productivity growth across the service sector.
7 
The classicals were mistaken when they assumed productivity growth was not possible in 
the agricultural sector.  It is also a mistake to assume that productivity growth is not possible in 
the service sector.  Use of computers is, after some delay, contributing to productivity growth in 
the financial services sector.  Television has made it possible for more people to watch World  
Series baseball or the Metropolitan Opera. Real costs in technology intensive transmission of 
television signals have declined. But the costs of labor-intensive programming have risen. 
                                                 
7 Estimates of industry contributions to U.S. aggregate total factor productivity growth during 1958-96 by Jorgenson 
and Strioh (2000) indicate negative contributions from the service sector and zero or negative contributions from 12 
non-service sector industries. Similarly the costs of computers, and of computing have declined dramatically.  But the costs of 
the more labor intensive software development has risen and accounts for an increase in cost 
share in the information sectors. The drivers of brown UPS trucks employ substantial 
information technology—but it still requires one driver to load and unload the packages and to 
drive the truck (Gordon 2000). 
It would be possible to make the model more sophisticated, and less intelligible, by 
introducing more sectors and making more realistic assumptions about substitution in the 
material and service components of consumption. One could also appeal to the scale economies 
and technological spillovers that have been emphasized in endogenous growth theory (Ruttan, 
1998).  The allocation of greater resources to the statistical agencies of the federal government 
would undoubtedly repair the underestimation of productivity growth in some service sectors. 
But it would take some very “creative” growth accounting to avoid a conclusion that if there are 
significant sectors in which productivity growth is not feasible, or is severely constrained, the 
effect would be some combination of increasing costs, or decline in quality, that would severely 
limit the possibilities of long-term sustainable economic growth.   
A clear implication is that the rate of growth in the total economy will regress toward the 
rate of growth in its least productive sectors!  This implies that in the early decades of the 21
st 
century the rate of economic growth in the U.S. will regress towards the low rate that will be 
achieved in an expanding service sector. REFERENCES 
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a Business sector.  Compensation deflated by implicit price deflator. 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Chart 1-4 of Economic Report of the President, 1995, p. 26.  Real 
income data for 1994–1997, productivity data for 1994–1998 and compensation data 
for 1994–1998 are from Economic Report of the President, 1999, p. 366 and 384.  
Real income data for 1998–2000, productivity data for 1999-2000 and compensation 





























































































Source:   Statistical Abstract of the United States.  Prepared by the Chief of the Bureau of 
Statistics, Teasury Department 1899, 1911. Bureau of the Census.  Historical 
Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C. :  U.S. Government Office, 1970. 





























































































Source:    Statistical Abstract of the United States.  Prepared by the Chief of the Bureau of 
Statistics, Teasury Department 1899, 1911. Bureau of the Census.  Historical 
Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C. :  U.S. Government Office, 
















































































AgricultureTable 1.  Hypothetical Growth Paths for a Two-Sector Economy 
 
AUTOMOBILE SECTOR  EDUCATION SECTOR 































Model I: No Reallocation of Labor 
 
t0  100  100  100  1.00  1,000  100  100  100  1.00  1,000 
t10  100  135  135  1.35  1,000  100  100  100  1.35  1,345 
t20  100  181  181  1.81  1,000  100  100  100  1.81  1,805 
t30  100  243  243  2.43  1,000  100  100  100  2.43  2,425 
Model II: Full Reallocation of Labor 
 
t0  100  100  100  1.00  1,000  100  100  100  1.00  1,000 
t10  74  135  100  1.35  1,000  126  100  126  1.35  1,245 
t20  55  181  100  1.81  1,000  145  100  145  1.81  1,805 
t30  41  243  100  2.43  1,000  159  100  159  2.43  2,425 
Assumption:  Productivity growths of 3.0 percent per year in automobile sector and 0.0 percent 
in the education sector. 
 
Source:  Author's calculations. Table 2  The Distribution of GNP by Major Industrial Sector, in Current Prices 
percentages) 
Industry  1947  1959  1969  1977  1990  1997 
                  
1. Declining Shares                   
Agricultural, forest and fishing  8.8  4.1  3.0  2.8  2.0  1.6 
Mining  2.9  2.5  1.8  2.7  1.8  1.5 
Manufacturing  28.1  28.6  26.9  23.6  18.4  17.0 
Total  39.8  35.2  31.7  29.4  22.2  20.1 
             
2. Stable Shares             
Transportation and utilities  8.9  9.1  8.6  9.1  8.7  8.3 
Construction  3.9  4.8  5.1  4.8  4.4  4.1 
Wholesale Trade  7.1  6.9  6.7  7.0  6.5  6.9 
Retail Trade  11.7  9.9  9.8  9.6  9.3  8.8 
Total  31.6  30.7  30.2  30.5  28.9  28.1 
             
3. Rising Shares             
Finance, insurance, and real estate  10.1  13.8  14.2  14.4  17.7  19.4 
Other services  8.6  9.7  11.5  13.  18.9  20.4 
Government  8.6  10.2  12.6  12.5  12.2  12.7 
Total  27.3  33.9  38.3  39.9  48.6  52.5 
Overall Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources:  Adapted from Z. Griliches. "Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint." American 
Economic Review 84 (1), March 1994, p. 1-23. Data are from Tables 6.1 and 6.2 of 
the National Income and Product Accounts. 1928-1982, and Survey of Current 
Business. May 1993 and March 1999. 
 
  